UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-23-2014

Tucker v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42448

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Tucker v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42448" (2014). Not Reported. 2004.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2004

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

THOMAS TAYLOR TUCKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

S.Ct. No. 42448
3-5427

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State ofidaho
In and For the County of Canyon

HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY,
District Judge

Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
db@nbmlaw.com

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Paul Panther
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II.

Statement of the Case .................................................... 1

11

A.

Nature of the Case ................................................. 1

B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts .............................. 1

III.

Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................ 3

IV.

Argument .............................................................. 4
A.

The Court Erred by Partially Dismissing the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by
Depriving Petitioner of His Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found in Either
the State's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Court's Notice ofintent to
Dismiss Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice ........................... 5

B.

Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to
Testify at Trial But That Counsel Rested the Case Without Calling Hirn to Testify
Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact That Trial Counsel's Performance Was
Deficient ......................................................... 8

C.

D.

1.

Standard of review ........................................... 8

2.

Facts pertaining to argument ................................... 8

3.

The deprivation of a client's right to testify is not a strategic decision
entitled to deference under Strickland; to the contrary , it is deficient
performance per se .......................................... l 0

Further, the Court Erred by Finding That Mr. Tucker Had Not Adequately Pleaded
That He Was Prejudiced by That Deficient Perfmmance and by Applying a Too
High of Standard for Showing Prejudice ............................... 13
1.

Mr. Tucker pleaded that he was prejudiced ....................... 13

2.

The court misapplied the Strickland prejudice standard ............. 13

The Court Erred by Dismissing the Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found
in Either the State's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Court's Notice of
Intent to Dismiss Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice ................... 14

E.

F.

V.

Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to
Testify at Trial But That Trial Counsel Rested the Case Without Calling Hirn to
Testify Created Genuine Issue of Material Fact That He Was Deprived of His
Right to Testify, Notwithstanding the Fact That the Court Advised Hirn Earlier in
The Trial That He Had the Right to Testify ............................. 15
1.

Facts pertaining to argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.

Why relief should be granted .................................. 15

This Issue Was Not Waived by the Failure to Raise it on Direct Appeal Because it
Could Not Have Been so Raised ..................................... 17
1.

Facts pertaining to argument .................................. 17

2.

Why relief should be granted .................................. 17

Conclusion ........................................................... 19

II

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Alicia v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982) ......................................................................... 12
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................................................................................. 5
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ............................................................................... 10
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) .......................................................................................... 10
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) ........................................................ 14
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) ............................................................................ 12
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ..................................................................................... 10
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) .......................................................................................... 4
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................... 12
STATE CASES

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) .............................................................. 19
Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 121 P.3d 965 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................. 11
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 177 P.3d 362 (2007) ........................................................ 15, 17
Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859,243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) ..................................................... 7
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009) .................................................. 7, 15
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 978 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................................... 8
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009) ............................................................. 7
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,819 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App. 1991) .............................................. 8
Kellyv. State, 149Idaho517,236P.3d 1277(2010) ....................................................... 7, 16, 17

Ill

Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 274 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................................... 5
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,900 P.2d 795 (1995) .......................................... 7, 15, 17
State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985) .............................. 4, 5, 11, 12, 18
State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995) ................................................................ 19
State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 778 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1989) ........................................... 4, 11
State v. Larkin, l 02 Idaho 231,628 P .2d 1065 (1981) ................................................................. 11
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008) ................................................................... 11
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2008) ............................................................. 18, 19
State v. Robinson, 982 P.2d 590 (Wash. 1999) ........................................................................... 12
DOCKETED CASES
State v. Tucker, No. 39405 (2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 323) ............................................... 1
STATE STATUTES
LC.§ 19-4901 .................................................................................................. 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, 17

OTHER
Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13 ......................................................................................................... 4, 10
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b )(1) .......................................................................................... 7

JV

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Thomas Tucker's petition for
post-conviction relief The order of summary dismissal should be reversed in part because the
court dismissed two of Mr. Tucker's claims on a basis not raised in the state's motion to dismiss
and without giving him twenty days notice. Moreover, the court erred because Mr. Tucker
established a genuine question of material fact regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and the deprivation of his right to testify.
B.

Procetlural History and Statement of Facts

Mr. Tucker was charged with felony D.U.I. and with being a Persistent Violator. He was
found guilty after a jury trial. He filed a Notice of Appeal. Appellate counsel raised a challenge
to the sentence imposed and to the denial of the Rule 35 motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed
in an unpublished opinion. State v. Tucker, No. 39405 (2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 323).
On June 3, 2013, Mr. Tucker filed a prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief. R 4. The petition raised three claims: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) collusion
between testifying police officers; 3) judicial bias. R 5. Counsel was appointed. R 34. The
court then filed a Notice oflntent to Dismiss. R 39. The state filed an Answer. R 49.
At a status conference on July 8, 2013, the court granted permission for appointed
counsel to file an Amended Petition. R 52; 67. On September 13, 2013, an Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief and an Affidavit of Petitioner were filed. R 68; 79. The Amended
Petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. R 80-83. The state filed an Answer to the Amended Petition. R

89.
On November 12, 2013, the court held a status conference. The state informed the court
that it intended to file a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The court noted that it would file a
Notice oflntent to Dismiss. R 92-93. The state later filed an Amended Answer and Motion for
Summary Dismissal. R 94; 97. It addressed the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
generally arguing that the claims were not supported by sufficient facts establishing deficient
performance and that the petition did not allege or establish that Mr. Tucker was prejudiced by
any deficient performance. R 99-102. The court never filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the
Amended Petition.
On April 1, 2014, Mr. Tucker sought permission to file a second amended petition. R
113. The motion was granted. R 135. The Second Amended Petition alleged six claims, two of
which are pertinent to this appeal:
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Petitioner to testify on his
own behalf at trial. R 117-118.
2. That Petitioner was deprived of his right to testify in his own behalf at trial
when trial counsel rested the defense case without calling him. R 119.
The respondent answered the second amended petition. R 132. It did not file a motion to
summarily dismiss this petition nor did the court file a notice of intent to dismiss the second
amended petition.
The court held a hearing on March 10, 2014, where the respondent told the court that it
was relying upon its motion to summarily dismiss the first amended petition. T pg. 8, In. 10-19.
The respondent reiterated its reliance on that motion at a July 14, 2014, hearing. T pg. 17, In. 1021. After hearing argument from the respondent and Mr. Tucker's counsel, the court granted the
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respondent's motion for summary disposition. T pg. 32, ln. 1-4. With regards to the claims
raised on appeal, the court stated its reasons for dismissal as follows.
The court dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to call
Petitioner to testify because Mr. Tucker had not shown that counsel's failure to call him as a
witness was deficient performance and he had not alleged or shown prejudice. R 158.
Next, the court dismissed the claim that Mr. Tucker was deprived of his right to testify for
two reasons. First, because "the Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was denied the right to
testify in his own behalf. The Record reflects that on May 17, 2011, prior to the jury selection
process, the court advised the Petitioner that he has a right to testify in his own behalf, and that
the decision whether to testify was his alone." R 161-162. Second, the court found the issue was
waived under LC. § 19-4901 (b): "Additionally, despite the lack of objection at the district court,
because the right to testify is a fundamental right, the issue could have been raised for the first
time on appeal. The appellate record could have been sufficiently developed to address the claim
that the district court did not advise the Petitioner of his right to testify and thus, the issue could
have been raised on appeal." R 161-62.
A Final Judgment was entered. R 164. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 166.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the court err by partially dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel due to the
deprivation of Petitioner's right to testify claim on a basis not found in either the state's motion
for summary disposition or the court's notice of intent to dismiss?
2. If not, did Mr. Tucker's verified statement that he told his attorney that he wanted to
testify at trial but that trial counsel rested the case without calling him to testify create a genuine

issue of material fact that trial counsel's performance was deficient?
3. Then, did the court also err in dismissing that claim by finding that Mr. Tucker had not
adequately pleaded and shown that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance?
4. Did the Court err by dismissing the right to testify claim on bases not found in either
the state's motion for summary disposition or the court's notice of intent to dismiss?
5. If not, did Mr. Tucker's verified statement that he told his attorney that he wanted to
testify at trial but that trial counsel rested the case without calling him to testify create a genuine
issue of material fact that he was deprived of his right to testify, notwithstanding the fact that the
court advised him earlier in the trial that he had the right to testify?
6. If so, did the court also err in finding that the issue was waived because it could have
been raised on appeal?

IV. ARGUMENT
Every criminal defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his or her own behalf. Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987). Although the right is not expressly set forth in the state and

federal constitutions, it is necessarily implied from the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and from the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id
483 U.S. at 51-52. See also, Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§ 13; State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708
P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985). The defendant is personally vested with the ultimate authority to
decide whether or not to testify. While counsel may advise the defendant regarding the decision,
the decision lies with the defendant and counsel must abide by the defendant's decision. State v.
Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 778 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1989).

In post-conviction, a petitioner may raise the issue of whether counsel inappropriately
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denied him or her the right to testify either as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a
claim of the deprivation of the constitutional right or as both. State v. Darb in, 109 Idaho 516,
522, 708 P.2d 921, 927 (Ct. App. 1985); Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,707,274 P.3d 1, 7
(Ct. App. 2012). If the claim is raised as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden
rests upon the defendant to both identify the acts or conduct alleged to have been deficient and to
show how such deficiency was prejudicial to the defense. Darb in, supra; Rossignol, supra. If
the claim is raised as a direct violation of the fundamental constitutional right to testify, then
once the defendant shows that he or she was deprived of the right, the burden shifts to the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute to the conviction.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be

held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id.
In this case, Mr. Tucker's Second Amended Petition raises the issue as both ineffective
assistance of counsel and as a deprivation of the constitutional right. In support of this claim,
Mr. Tucker alleged, inter alia, that he told trial counsel that he wanted to testify but that counsel
rested the defense case without calling him. Further, there was no recorded waiver of Mr.
Tucker's right to testify at the trial.
A.

The Court Erred by Partially Dismissing the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by
Depriving Petitioner of His Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found in Either the
State's Motion for Summary Disposition or the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice

Here, the district court had three reasons for dismissing the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel claim. First, that "Petitioner has failed to support his claim with any evidence that the
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failure to call him as a witness was [a strategic decision] based on ignorance of the relevant law,
inadequate preparation or other shortcomings of objective evaluation." R 158. Second, the
Court found that "[t]he Petitioner has not alleged that he suffered any prejudice

ie [sic], that the

outcome of the trial would have been different." R 158. Third, "[i]n light of the other evidence
presented at trial, it does not appear to this Court that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had the Petitioner testified." R 159. All three reasons are in error.
To begin, the court erred by dismissing this claim for the first reason because the state did
not raise that argument in its Motion for Summary Dismissal nor did the court raise those
arguments sua sponte in its Notice oflntent to Dismiss. Therefore, Mr. Tucker did not receive
proper notice under LC. § 19-4901 (b), which requires the court to give twenty days notice of its
intent to dismiss on any basis not raised in the state's motion to dismiss. Here, the ineffective
assistance of counsel due to the denial of Petitioner's right to testify claim was not pleaded until
the Amended Petition, R 81, while the court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss was filed just two
weeks after the filing of the original prose petition. Unsurprisingly, the court's notice did not
address the ineffective assistance due to the deprivation of Petitioner's right to testify claim as it
had not yet been pleaded. See R 39-45.
For its part, the state in its Motion for Summary Dismissal argued that: 1) all the claims
were not supported by admissible evidence; 2) that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
"do not have any supporting information sufficient to show that there was deficient performance
by the attorney" and 3) that "there is zero admissible evidence in the Amended Petition to
indicate that "but for" the deficient or ineffective conduct, the results would have been different."
R 99. Thus, neither document gave Mr. Tucker notice of the first basis upon which the court
6

dismissed the claim.
This portion of the dismissal should be reversed because of the lack of notice. The
applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009):
Pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to LC.§ 194906(c), if the state files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss,
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State,
127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b),
but not section (c), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is
that, under subsection (c), the motion itself serves as notice that summary
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) requires
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See DeRushe v. State,
146 Idaho 599,200P.3d1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable
particularity in post-conviction cases.) If the state's motion fails to give such
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b). See
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state
has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice.
147 Idaho at 517, 211 P .3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). ("Thus, where a trial court dismisses a claim based upon
grounds other than those offered - by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20-day notice period.") See also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859,865,243 P.3d 675,681 (Ct.
App. 2010) (Noting that if the court dismisses on grounds not presented in the state's motion, the
petitioner has no opportunity to respond and attempt to establish a material issue of fact.).
Here, neither the court's notice nor the state's motion gave Mr. Tucker notice of the first
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reason upon which the court dismissed the ineffective assistance claim. This was error under LC.
§ 19-4906(b)( c) and this Court should vacate that portion of the order of dismissal. Further, as

explained below, the court's rulings are erroneous on the merits and reversal is also required for
that reason.

B.

Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to Testify
at Trial But That Trial Counsel Rested tlte Case Wit/tout Calling Him to Testify
Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact That Trial Counsel's Performance Was
Deficient
1.

Standard of review

An order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief petition is appropriate only
ifthere exists no genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in applicant's favor, would
entitle him or her to the requested relief. If a genuine question of material fact exists, an
evidentiary hearing must be held. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163
(Ct. App. 1991). When reviewing a summary disposition of a post-conviction petition, this
Court will independently review the record to determine whether a genuine question of material
fact exists, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684-85, 978 P.2d. 241, 244-245 (Ct. App. 1999).
The court erred in dismissing the right to testify claim because there were genuine
questions of material fact regarding whether trial counsel's performance was deficient when he
prevented Mr. Tucker from testifying and whether that deficiency prejudiced Mr. Tucker.
2.

Facts pertaining to argument

The Second Amended Petition made the following allegations relevant to the right to
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testify claim:
18. Petitioner had discussed with his counsel whether Petitioner should testify at
his trial and Petitioner expressed a desire to testify in his own behalf.
19. Nonetheless, Petitioner's counsel concluded the presentation of the defense
evidence without calling Petitioner as a witness.
20. This failure prejudiced Petitioner at trial by eliminating the opportunity
Petitioner had of explaining to the jury, himself, the facts he had regarding the
case.
21. Petitioner's testimony would have been considered by the jury in its
deliberations and could have resulted in a favorable verdict for Petitioner.

31. Petitioner had an absolute right to testify at his own trial.
32. Petitioner was surprised by his attorney's representation the day of trial that
no expert witness had been retained and would not be testifying, causing him to be
confused and disoriented in his decision-making.
33. Petitioner desired to testify in his own behalf at trial.
34. Petitioner does not recall his judge advising him that he had a right to testify,
or not testify, and that this decision was his to make not the attorney's decision.
35. Not familiar with the rights he had, not familiar with the processes of a trial,
Petitioner was unaware that he could have testified even though his attorney had
advised against it.
36. Petitioner could have provided information for the jury to consider in its
deliberations which could have resulted in a favorable verdict.
R 117-119.

The verified Second Amended Petition was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Tucker. He
alleged the following facts:
21. That Petitioner had told Deaton [defense counsel] that he wanted to testify in
his own defense at the trial, but Deaton closed his presentation of evidence
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without letting Petitioner testify.
22. That he does not believe that he was advised by the Court that he had a right
to testify, regardless of the desire of his attorney, and, had he known this, would
have insisted on testifying.
23. That Petitioner desired to offer the following testimony: he was fatigued,
having been awake and working for more than 30 hours, he had not wet his pants,
rather he urinated into a container, as he sometimes does as he is nearly
incontinent, and the container spilled in his lap; the uneven surface upon which he
was standing while performing the field sobriety tests was causing him difficulty
because he was wearing cowboy riding boots with a 2 1/4-inch undershot heel; the
mechanical problems with the truck were such that the truck kept veering off to
the side requiring constant correction and made it difficult for Petitioner to drive
straight on the road; the officer's overhead lights on his car and the rain and wet
conditions were bothering his eyes; and, he did not take the breath test because he
was confused by the advisory given him prior to the test.
R 123-24.
3.

The deprivation of a client's right to testify is not a strategic decision entitled to
deference under Strickland: to the contrary, it is deficient performance per se

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance

of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I.C. § 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
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( 1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
The court here stated that the decision to not call Mr. Tucker to testify was a strategic
decision of the type which should not be second-guessed by the court. Presumably, the court was
referring to the series of cases which hold "[t]he decision of what witnesses to call 'is an area
where we will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.'" State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548,563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008), quoting State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231,234,628 P.2d 1065,
1068 (1981); and citing Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005).
Those cases, however, are not applicable here because it is not counsel's decision whether or not
the defendant will testify. The right to testify is personal to the defendant and cannot be taken
away by counsel even if counsel's reasons for wanting to do so are good. The decision whether
to testify lies with the defendant and counsel must abide by the defendant's decision. State v.
Hoffman, supra. Thus, counsel's failure to call Mr. Tucker to testify is deficient performance per
se.

The Court of Appeals has held that the decision of whether the defendant should testify is
the "one exception" to the general rule that counsel's decision on what witnesses to call is a
matter of trial strategy. State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516,521,708 P.2d 921,926 (Ct. App. 1985).
In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited to a Seventh Circuit case which "held that
11

the decision whether a defendant should testify was personal to the defendant and could not be
made by his counsel as a matter of trial strategy." Id., citing Alicia v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920
(7 th Cir. 1982). As the Washington Supreme Court has noted:

As to the first step in the Strickland analysis, we hold that a defendant who is able
to prove that his attorney actually prevented him from testifying has satisfied
Strickland's first requirement. As noted above, it is well established that the
defendant's right to testify is fundamental and may not be abrogated by defense
counsel. The decision whether or not to take the stand rests with the defendant.
Therefore, an attorney who takes steps to abridge this right, against the will of the
client, is providing deficient counsel. Preventing a client from testifying against
the client's wishes falls below the objective standard of reasonable conduct for
attorneys.

State v. Robinson, 982 P.2d 590,598 (Wash. 1999). Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has written:
Where the defendant claims a violation of his right to testify by defense counsel,
the essence of the claim is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the
defendant of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf. In
other words, by not protecting the defendant's right to testify, defense counsel's
performance fell below the constitutional minimum, thereby violating the first
prong of the Strickland test. For example, if defense counsel refused to accept the
defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would
have acted unethically to prevent the defendant from exercising his fundamental
constitutional right to testify. . . . . Under such circumstances, defense counsel has
not acted " 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases[.]"'

United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1992), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687, in tum quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
In light of the above, Mr. Tucker had sufficiently shown deficient perfom1ance under

Strickland to avoid summary dismissal. The unrebutted evidence before the court was that trial
counsel knew that Mr. Tucker wanted to testify, but that he rested the defense case without
calling Mr. Tucker to testify. That evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine question of
material fact.
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C.

Further, the Court Erred by Finding That Mr. Tucker Had Not Adequately Pleaded
That He Was Prejudiced by That Deficient Performance and by Applying a Too High
of Standard for Showing Prejudice

I.

Mr. Tucker pleaded that he was prejudiced

In addition to failing to find a prima facie case of deficient performance, the court also

found that "[t]he Petitioner has not alleged that he suffered any prejudice - ie [sic], that the
outcome of the trial would have been different." R 158. However, it is unclear what the court
means by this because the pleadings are clear that Mr. Tucker did allege he was prejudiced. He
alleged in ,r 21 of the Second Amended Petition that "Petitioner's testimony would have been
considered by the jury in its deliberations and could have resulted in a favorable verdict for
Petitioner." R 118. And he alleged in ,r 36 that "Petitioner could have provided information for
the jury to consider in its deliberations which could have resulted in a favorable verdict." R 119.
Further, he alleged in his affidavit what facts he would have testified to had he been called at trial
R 124. Thus, the court's finding that prejudice was not pleaded is disproved by the record and
the case should not have been dismissed on that basis. While it is true that Mr. Tucker alleged
that his testimony "could" and not "would" have resulted in a different verdict, he is only
required to prove "could" under Strickland.
Moreover, in addition to the factual error, the court also applied an incorrect standard of
Strickland prejudice when evaluating this claim.
2.

The court misapplied the Strickland prejudice standard

The court found that Strickland required that the Petitioner must show that he suffered
"prejudice," which it defined as a showing "that the outcome of the trial would have been
different." R 158. However, the court's understanding of Strickland prejudice is inconcct. The
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Supreme Court has written that "Strickland asks whether it is 'reasonably likely' the result would
have been different. This does not require a showing that counsel's actions more likely than not
altered the outcome[.]" Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (internal
citations omitted). Strickland does not require a showing that the result of the proceeding would
have been different. While Harrington states that the difference between a showing of
reasonable probability and a preponderance of the evidence is "slight," the difference is real and
legally significant. Consequently, the court's dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim should be reversed due to the court's application of an incorrect standard.
D.

The Court Erred by Dismissing the Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found in
Either the State's Motion for Summary Disposition or the Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice

Here, the district court's reason for dismissing the right to testify claim was that the
record showed Mr. Tucker was advised of his right to testify by the criminal trial court and that
the issue was waived because it should have been raised on appeal. Both reasons are in error, as
will be explained below. But again, this Court need not reach those issues because the court
erred by dismissing this claim when the state did not raise those arguments in its Motion for
Summary Dismissal nor did the court raise those arguments sua sponte in its Notice oflntent to
Dismiss. Therefore, the dismissal of this cause of action also occurred without proper notice.
The right to testify claim was not pleaded until the Second Amended Petition. The state
did not address this claim at all in its Motion for Summary Dismissal, which was filed after the
filing of the first Amended Petition but before the filing of the second. See R 97-102 (combined
motion and memorandum). The court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss was filed seven months
before the state's motion, just two weeks after the filing of the original prose petition. It also did
14

not address the right to testify claim. See R 39-45. Thus, neither document gave Mr. Tucker
notice of the bases upon which the court eventually summarily dismissed the claim.
The dismissal should be reversed because of the lack of notice required by I.C. § 194906(b) and Buss v. State, as previously set forth.
Here, neither the court's notice nor the state's motion gave Mr. Tucker notice of the
reasons upon which the court dismissed the right to testify claim. While this might be
understandable since the claim had not yet been raised when those pleadings were filed, it is still
error under I. C. § 19-4906(b)(c). This Court should vacate that portion of the order of dismissal
and remand for further proceedings. But, as explained below, even if the absence of notice were
to be disregarded, the court's rulings are erroneous on the merits and reversal is still required.
E.

Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to Testify
at Trial But That Trial Counsel Rested the Case Without Calling Him to Testify
Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact That He Was Deprived of His Right to
Testify, Notwithstanding the Fact That the Court Advised Him Earlier in the Trial
That He Had the Right to Testify

1.

Facts pertaining to argument

See Section B(2) above.
2.

Why relief should be granted

The court erred in dismissing the right to testify claim because there was a genuine
question of material fact regarding whether trial counsel prevented Mr. Tucker from testifying by
resting his case without calling Mr. Tucker to testify. "In determining whether a motion for
summary disposition is properly granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable
to the petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if true."
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995): Baldwin v. State, 145
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Idaho 148, I 53, 177 P.3d 362, 367 (2007). Summary disposition for failure to raise a genuine
issue of material fact may be granted only if the petitioner's evidence, based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file, raises no genuine issue of
material fact. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho at 521,236 P.3d at 1281.
The court here found there was no question of material fact writing that:
[T]he Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was denied the right to testify in his
own behalf. The Record reflects that on May 17, 2011, prior to the jury selection
process, the court advised the Petitioner that he has a right to testify in his own
behalf, and that the decision whether to testify was his alone.
R 161-162. However, the record, which consists of a minute note from the criminal case, does
not support that finding. The note states:
The Court advised the defendant of his constitutional right against selfincrimination and his right to remain silent. Further, the right to testify was his
choice and that ifhe did testify he could be cross-examined by the State within the
scope of anything he testified to on direct examination. The defendant indicated
he understood his rights as explained by the Court.
R 145.
Nowhere in that minute note does it indicate that Mr. Tucker was advised that "the
decision whether to testify was his alone" as found by the court. It says he was advised that "the
right to testify was his choice," which is more naturally understood to mean that the state could
not require him to testify against his will. That must have been the way Mr. Tucker understood
the court's advisement because he stated in his affidavit that "he does not believe that he was
advised by the Court that he had a right to testify regardless of the desire of his attorney, and, had
he known this, would have insisted on testifying." R 124. 1

Unfortunately, the portion of the trial where this colloquy occurred was not reported or
transcribed from the audio recording for the direct appeal. See Exhibit A to State's Answer
1
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The trial court's advisement of the right to testify does not disprove the unrebutted
allegation that Mr. Tucker was deprived of that right when counsel rested the defense case
without calling Mr. Tucker to testify. It is worth noting that defense counsel did not file an
affidavit disputing any of Mr. Tucker's allegations. Taking the record and Mr. Tucker's
allegations in the light most favorable to him, there is a genuine question of material fact
regarding whether he told counsel he wanted to testify but that defense counsel deprived him of
that right by resting the defense case without calling him to testify. Consequently, the order
dismissing this claim should be reversed. Kelly v. State, supra; Saykhamchone v. State, supra;
Baldwin v. State, supra.
F.

This Issue Was Not Waived by the Failure to Raise it on Direct Appeal Because it
Could Not Have Been so Raised

I.

Facts pertaining to argument

The court also dismissed the right to testify issue finding that the issue
was waived under LC.§ 19-4901(b). It wrote:
Additionally, despite the lack of objection at the district court, because the right
to testify is a fundamental right, the issue could have been raised for the first time
on appeal. The appellate record could have been sufficiently developed to address
the claim that the district court did not advise the Petitioner of his right to testify
and thus, the issue could have been raised on appeal.
R 161-62.
2.

Why relief should be granted

In fact, the right to testify claim could not have been raised for the first time on appeal.

(copy of trial transcript); and R 143 (Minute Note from trial indicating that "[t]he Court noted for
the record it was proceeding without a Court Reporter at this time to take up preliminary matters
before the prospective jury panel was brought in."). The trial transcript also does not show an on
the record ,vaiver of Mr. Tucker's right to testify.
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State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 523, 708 P.2d 921, 928 (Ct. App. 1985). In Darbin, the
defendant-appellant raised a claim on direct appeal that counsel deprived him of his right to
testify. The Court of Appeals declined to rule on this issue on appeal stating that it should be
raised in a post-conviction petition. The Court wrote:
Although Darbin' s contention involves a fundamental constitutional right, we are
reluctant to rule upon that contention because the issue has been framed by an
insufficient record in this direct appeal from his conviction. While we have
determined that this issue is not truly one involving the effectiveness of counsel,
we believe that any further development of the issues should be pursued on a
petition for post-conviction relief, as is suggested by certain decisions of the Idaho
appellate courts in dealing similarly with ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
109 Idaho at 523, 708 P.2d at 928. Under Darbin the right to testify claim could not have been
raised on direct appeal and the court here erred in holding it was waived under 19-4901(b) for
failing to do so.
In addition, it has become more difficult to raise an unobjected-to error on direct appeal
since Darbin was decided. Under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961, 978 (2008),
unobjected-to error may only be raised for the first time on appeal in cases where: (1) the
defendant has alleged a violation of a constitutionally protected right; (2) the error is clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning in most instances that it must have affected
the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. In this case, Mr. Tucker could not have raised the claim
on appeal under Perry because the error was not clear or obvious. There is no indication in the
criminal trial record that Mr. Tucker wanted to testify, that he informed his counsel that he
wanted to testify or that defense counsel rested the defense case without obtaining a waiver of
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Mr. Tucker's right to testify. As the Perry Court noted, "[i]f there is insufficient evidence in the
appellate record to show clear error, the matter would be better handled in post-conviction
proceedings." 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978. In addition, the claim could not be raised
under Perry because the record in the direct appeal did not contain a proffer of Mr. Tucker's
anticipated trial testimony. Thus, he would not have been able to show his testimony would have
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings as required by Perry.
Finally, the court below is mistaken in its belief that the simple failure of the trial court to
fully advise Mr. Tucker of his right to testify was a claim which could have been raised on
appeal. It is long-established that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of his right to
testify or obtain an on the record waiver of that right. The Supreme Court said in Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988), that:

We agree with the majority of courts which have addressed this issue and decline
to require an on-the-record waiver of defendant's right to testify. Such a
requirement would necessarily entail the trial court advising defendant of his right
to testify.... [A] formal waiver requirement might provoke substantial judicial
participation that could frustrate a thoughtfully considered decision by the
defendant and counsel who are designing trial strategy.
114 Idaho at 762, 760 P.2d at 1178, quoting People v. Simmons, 364 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Mich.
App. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912, 908
P.2d 1211, 12 I 9 (1995). The court's dismissal under LC. I 9-4901 (b) cannot be affirmed under
this rationale either.
V. CONCLUSION
for the reasons set forth above, Mr. Tucker respectfully requests that the order of
summary disposition as to his claims that his counsel was ineffective for not calling him to testify
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and that he was deprived of his right to testify be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted thi01a_y of December, 2014.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Thomas Tucker
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